

**Baker
McKenzie.**

**Annual Compliance
Conference 2024**



Managing compliance risks in the transactional context

Wednesday 1 May 2024





Speakers



James Robinson
Partner (Chair)
London



Geoff Martin
Partner
Washington, DC



Ash Tiwari
Partner
London



Eva Warden
Senior Associate
London



Ashley Eickhof
Senior Associate
Washington, DC




01 Compliance in the transaction lifecycle

The background of the slide is a solid blue color on the left side, which transitions into a 3D hexagonal pattern on the right side. The hexagons are arranged in a honeycomb-like structure and have a slight depth, giving them a three-dimensional appearance. The overall color scheme is a monochromatic blue.

Compliance in the transaction lifecycle


Mergers, acquisitions, sales and joint ventures are integral to many companies' growth or consolidation strategies. However, with all of the potential upside of doing deals, there are also risks arising from increased enforcement, the broadening of the jurisdictional reach of compliance laws, as well as the increasingly global nature of investigations and litigation risks. It is important to conduct effective compliance due diligence (DD) in the context of M&A/JV transactions, efficiently assessing risks to avoid acquiring liability. Between transactions you need to consider the clean integration of the target, check for compliance risks in your existing business portfolio and prepare business units for a clean and efficient future sale.




02 The M&A lawyer's perspective



Why does compliance investigation matter in M&A transactions?



What does good practice compliance DD in M&A look like?




Contractual solutions




So, what are the solutions if a compliance issue is raised during the diligence process?



Call off the deal



Restructure
deal perimeter



Remediation
of issues



Warranties



Indemnities



W&I insurance

03 Successor and parental liability



EU competition law - infringements by subsidiaries


Parental liability

- Parent will be held jointly and severally liable for its subsidiary if it exercises "decisive influence" over it (influence over commercial behaviour, economic, organisational and legal links) – sufficient that influence is restricted to high level strategy
- Where parent holds all or almost all of the capital in a subsidiary, there is a rebuttable presumption that it exercises decisive influence
- It is for the 100% controlling entity to rebut the presumption by showing that subsidiary can act with complete operational and financial autonomy (very difficult)
- Minority stake with de facto control or board representation/strategic veto rights = decisive influence
- Parent may be liable though unaware of infringement

Successor liability


- Ex-parent is liable for the breaches that occurred while it was the owner of the infringing subsidiary
- Buyer of shares/assets can be held liable for pre-acquisition violations if there is no other legal entity to be fined (e.g., where pre-existing legal owner of the business has been dissolved by the seller)

Example: Goldman Sachs



- **2014:** Goldman Sachs held jointly and severally liable for EUR 37.3 million fine imposed on ex-subsubsidiary owned by its PE arm during the period 2005-2009 and which participated in the high voltage power cable cartel (Goldman Sachs had since sold its interest)
- **Fine upheld by EU Court of Justice in 2021:** GS had exercised decisive control over ex-subsubsidiary through voting rights (100% for two years) and board representation (ability to revoke members). Court rejected argument that GS = pure financial investor
- GS held the investment for only 4 years, including one year where its equity stake was less than 50%, and did not even know of the existence of the cartel prior to the EC investigation – yet still held liable
- Financial investors with significant stakes in portfolio companies may be exposed to antitrust liability if that portfolio is later found to have violated competition law during the investor's period of ownership:
 - Liability presumed (i) if the investor owns all, or nearly all, the shares in the investment company or (ii) if it exercises all the voting rights, even if it does not hold all the share capital – very difficult to rebut
 - Liability can also arise where the investor exercises decisive influence over the portfolio – Court confirmed that the Commission could rely on factors including the power to appoint board members or propose their revocation, to call shareholders' meetings, the role played in the boards of directors and strategic committee, and the provision of regular updates and reports on the business
 - Liability can arise even if shareholding is less than 50%; the shareholding was only for part of the cartel period; or the financial investor did not participate in, or even know about the infringement

DOJ guidance – successor liability



M&A is a key factor in UK enforcement

A number of the SFO's UKBA enforcement cases involved M&A-related issues:

- Deferred Prosecution Agreements arising from M&A activity
 - Standard Bank
 - Sarclad
 - Amec Foster Wheeler
- The UKBA cases to date relating to M&A underline the importance of thorough M&A due diligence, and effective contractual protections from a compliance perspective



SFO

serious
fraud
office

Recent cases arising from M&A acquisitions

Novartis-Alcon (June 2020)

- Alcon Vietnam bribed providers to increase sales of Alcon's intraocular lenses. **The payments continued after Alcon merged with Novartis and became an indirect wholly-owned subsidiary.**
- Novartis and its local subsidiaries (including Alcon) made improper payments to public and private healthcare providers in Greece, Vietnam and South Korea so they would use Novartis-branded pharmaceutical products.
- SEC charged Novartis with violating the FCPA. Novartis agreed to disgorge \$92.3 million plus prejudgment interest of \$20.5 million.
- Novartis Hellas paid a criminal penalty of \$225 million and entered a three-year DPA with the DOJ. Alcon. paid a separate criminal penalty of \$8.9 million and also entered into a DPA.
- Note that for this case, **even after the merger and with the knowledge of Novartis, the bribery continued.**

Amec Foster-Wheeler (June 2021)

- 2012-2014: Amec Foster Wheeler's UK subsidiary, Foster Wheeler Energy Limited, made improper payments to Brazilian officials in connection with its efforts to win the contract and establish a business presence in Brazil. The bribes were paid through third party agents, including one agent who failed Amec Foster Wheeler's due diligence process, but was allowed to continue working "unofficially" on the project.
- 2017: Energy services giant John Wood Group PLC took over Amec Foster Wheeler.
- Amec Foster Wheeler (now owned by the Wood group) agreed with the DOJ and SEC to pay about \$41 million in penalties and disgorgement to resolve FCPA offenses in Brazil.


Safran (December 2022)

- 1999-2015: prior to Safran's acquisition, Monogram and its German subsidiary EVAC GmbH paid millions of dollars to a China-based business consultant who was a close relative of a then-senior Chinese government official to obtain train lavatory contracts with the Chinese government.
- **The DOJ declined prosecution, citing Safran's timely and voluntary self-disclosure of the misconduct, its full and proactive cooperation and remediation,** including terminating and disciplining employees involved, and efforts to enhance its anti-corruption training and compliance program.
- DOJ found the **misconduct at Monogram and EVAC had ceased before Safran acquired them, and that Safran identified the misconduct "through post-acquisition due diligence and disclosed it to US authorities."**
- Safran agreed to disgorge \$17.9 million in profits.

04 Authority expectations and incentives



Essential elements of compliance: Expectations of competition regulators



DOJ Policy Updates

Clarity on Cooperation and Self-Reporting Expectations



- New Corporate Enforcement Policy ("CEP") applies to **all** Criminal Division.
- Absent aggravating circumstances, a company can earn a presumption of a declination if it:
 - Voluntarily self-discloses misconduct;
 - Fully cooperates with an investigation;
 - Disgorges ill-gotten profits; and
 - Timely and appropriately remediates.
- Even with aggravating circumstances, a company can obtain a declination if:
 - Self-disclosure made immediately upon learning of the allegation;
 - Effective compliance program and accounting controls enabled discovery of the misconduct; and
 - Extraordinary cooperation and remediation.

If a company self-discloses, cooperates, and remediates, but doesn't receive a declination, it can obtain between a 50%-75% discount off the low end of the guideline range.

DOJ Safe Harbor Policy

October 4, 2023: [Safe Harbor Policy for Voluntary Self-Disclosures Made in Connection with Mergers and Acquisitions:](#)

- To qualify for the Safe Harbor, companies must disclose misconduct discovered at the acquired entity within six months from the date of closing.
- Companies will then have a baseline of one year from the date of closing to fully remediate the misconduct.
- Any misconduct disclosed under the Safe Harbor Policy will not be factored into future recidivist analysis for the acquiring company.
- Failure to conduct effective diligence or self-disclose misconduct at an acquired entity will subject buyer to full successor liability for that misconduct under the law.



Antitrust immunity / leniency regimes

Key trigger of investigations but authorities also have other tools

Policy mechanism designed to incentivise self-reporting of serious cartel violations

Extensive cooperation obligations

Originated in the US, now employed by all major competition law jurisdictions

Can include criminal and administrative immunity

Typically full immunity from fines for information leading to an investigation, leniency reductions for information representing significant added value




US Leniency

Revisions to Leniency program, added new requirement for corporate applicants: **promptness**

Applicants must improve the company's compliance program using "**best efforts**", and guard against "**risk of recidivism**"

Type B: Available **after** the Division has opened an investigation into the illegal activity and corporate applicant satisfies criteria

Division **stricter on Type B employees**, will assess "relative culpability," and must admit wrongdoing



Applicants must undertake remedial measures to "**fully**" remediate harm

Type A: Available **before** the Division has opened an investigation and not received information about the illegal activity from any other source

Revisions Narrow Type B Protections: non-prosecution protection for directors, officers, and employees is **not** guaranteed



UK Type A / B leniency

First applicant to come forward with evidence of a cartel

Type A leniency:

- Provides guaranteed corporate immunity, immunity for cooperating individuals, protection against director disqualification
- Available before CMA has started investigation, where CMA does not already have sufficient information to establish existence of the cartel and info gives the CMA sufficient basis for taking forward a credible investigation

Type B leniency:

- Provides discretionary corporate immunity/fine reduction up to 100%, discretionary immunity for some/all individuals, protection against director disqualification
- Available after CMA has started investigation, if docs/info add significant value to the CMA's investigation



UK Type C leniency

Reductions of up to 50%


- Discretionary. May be available if a business:
 - Is not the first to come forward with information but does so before Statement of Objections, or
 - Is the first applicant but was coerced
- To qualify for a reduction, the business must provide documents / information that add significant value to the CMA's investigation
- Other benefits: discretionary immunity for specific individuals and protection from director disqualification



05 Key take-aways



Key take-aways



Questions





Next week

Sanctions and export controls

7 – 9 May 2024

Trade policy response to geopolitical disruption – China and beyond

Tuesday 7 May, 3.00 - 4.00 pm BST | 4.00 - 5.00 pm CEST | 10.00 - 11.00 am EDT

Global strategies for handling sanctions regulators and enforcement

Wednesday 8 May, 3.00 - 4.00 pm BST | 4.00 - 5.00 pm CEST | 10.00 - 11.00 am EDT

Global sanctions and export controls update

Thursday 9 May, 3.00 - 4.30 pm BST | 4.00 - 5.30 pm CEST | 10.00 - 11.30 am EDT



Baker McKenzie delivers integrated solutions to complex challenges.

Complex business challenges require an integrated response across different markets, sectors and areas of law. Baker McKenzie's client solutions provide seamless advice, underpinned by deep practice and sector expertise, as well as first-rate local market knowledge. Across more than 70 offices globally, Baker McKenzie works alongside our clients to deliver solutions for a connected world.

bakermckenzie.com

Baker & McKenzie is a member firm of Baker & McKenzie International, a global law firm with member law firms around the world. In accordance with the common terminology used in professional service organizations, reference to a "partner" means a person who is a partner, or equivalent, in such a law firm. Similarly, reference to an "office" means an office of any such law firm. This may qualify as "Attorney Advertising" requiring notice in some jurisdictions. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

© 2024 Baker McKenzie

